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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2019

TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP
MEETING, DECEMBER 1, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

11. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-079.

12. (U) Meeting Date: December 1, 2009
Time: 3:00 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

13. (S) At the Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group meeting chaired by Mr. Elliott and Colonel Ryzhkov, the Russian side presented options involving cutting holes into the first stage motor case after the solid propellant had been removed by burning. One option involved cutting a 10 centimeter hole in the first stage motor case which would require verification by inspection, and the other option involved cutting a hole large enough to be visible by national technical means (NTM). The Russian side preferred the second option since it did not involve on-site inspection. The Russian side accepted the 60-day period for verifying elimination of silo launchers by NTM. End Summary.

14. (U) Subject Summary: NTM to Verify Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs; NTM Means No Inspection Rights; Another Use for Empty Launch Canisters; A Move on Mobile Launcher Elimination Procedures; 60-Days: An Act of Russian Diplomacy; and Review of Previously Provided SLBM Launcher CorE Procedures.

¶5. (S) Col Ryzhkov began the meeting reminding the U.S. side that in a telephone call the previous day, President Obama and President Medvedev reiterated their intent to have a treaty signed by December 5, 2009, after which he turned to the discussion of Section II, Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs. He indicated that the Russian side had developed two options to aid in the verification of solid propellant removal from first stage motor cases. Option one involved removing the solid propellant from the motor cases of all stages of a missile by burning and cutting a hole at least 10 centimeters in diameter in the first stage motor case. Option two involved removing the solid propellant from the motor cases of all stages of a missile by burning and cutting a hole in the first stage motor case that could be verified by national technical means (NTM). Ryzhkov stated option two required a hole approximately one meter in diameter so that it would be visible to NTM. The appeal of option two was that it would negate the need for on-site inspection.

¶6. (S) Mr. Elliott remarked that the U.S. side had drawn from the discussion at the previous day's meeting to develop U.S.-proposed text that included similar language. Elliott proceeded to review this draft text. Paragraph 1 relating to the elimination of liquid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs matched Russian-proposed text with the exception of the phrase, "such

that the ICBMs and SLBMs are rendered inoperable, precluding their use as a ballistic missile." The phrase had been removed since it was captured in paragraph 2 of the General Provisions Section. Elliott noted that although paragraph 2 focused only on the removal of the propellant from the first stage of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, it was understood that fuel would be removed from all stages as they were eliminated. Elliott noted the U.S.-proposed text for launch canister elimination included cutting at least a 5.3 meter segment from the body of the launch canister. This language was included for two reasons: 1) the 5.3 meter cut demonstrated that no missile could be contained in the remains of the launch canister, and 2) this left a segment sufficient in length to permit its use in construction as the Russian side had suggested it intended to do.

¶7. (S) Ryzhkov noted that paragraph 4, which addressed inspection rights when burning or washing was used to remove the propellant from the motor stages, could be more clearly stated using the following formulation: Solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs shall not be removed until elimination is confirmed by inspection or upon the expiration of the 30-day period identified for this process. Elliott took note of the suggestion and stated this formulation would be taken back for study. In addition, Elliott noted the U.S.-proposed text did not include detailed procedures for the notification of elimination and the subsequent inspection, and would not include detailed procedures for these notifications until the sides had decided whether the batching technique would be used for verification.

NTM MEANS NO INSPECTION RIGHTS

¶8. (S) Ryzhkov asked what Elliott thought about the Russian proposal for verifying the elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs by NTM. Ryzhkov believed that both the Russian-proposed concept of cutting a large hole in the first stage motor case and the U.S.-proposed concept of cutting the first stage motor case after the propellant had been removed could be verified by NTM and on-site inspection was not required. The Russian side proposed the use of NTM since the quota for inspections would be small. Elliott replied that there was little doubt that cutting a one meter hole in the motor case was fatal;

however, the issue, when using NTM for verification, was that a side could not accurately verify which missiles were being eliminated. This could only be accomplished through inspection and verification of unique identifiers (UIDs).

¶9. (S) Ryzhkov reminded the U.S. side that Russia could not accept any procedures that encompassed using UIDs until the U.S. side had accepted the Russian package deal.

Specifically the Russian side could not accept the U.S.-proposed text to read and verify the data from the UID on the first stage rocket motor and associated launch canister. Elliott remarked that when the U.S. side presented its package deal, the Russian side selected items from the package at will and maybe this presented the same type of situation. With a smile, Ryzhkov said it was his duty to make that statement.

¶10. (S) Ryzhkov noted that the U.S. side had neglected to

add loading tubes to the paragraph that addressed the elimination of launch canisters. He suggested that loading tubes either be added or the paragraph deleted since the launch canister was not a weapon and posed no threat to the United States.

¶11. (S) Ryzhkov reiterated that whatever elimination procedures were decided upon for ICBMs and SLBMs, the Russian side wanted to be able to conduct the procedures at the site where the ICBM or SLBM was located. For instance, when conducting static firing at the Perm' or Krasnoarmeysk burn stands, Russia did not want to be obligated to return the spent stages to Votkinsk for elimination; they wanted to complete the elimination at the site where the static firing took place. Elliott responded that the U.S. proposal took this into account. Ryzhkov stated this should also pertain to the elimination of launch canisters. When Russia conducted a flight test at a test range, it did not want to be obligated to return the launch canister to Votkinsk for elimination, Russia wanted to complete the elimination process at the test range.

ANOTHER USE FOR EMPTY LAUNCH CANISTERS

¶12. (S) Mr. Shevchenko asked whether there was a particular reason the U.S. side was demanding elimination procedures that limited launch canister use after elimination. Elliott explained the United States proposed elimination procedures for the launch canisters because without them, the United States could not discriminate a loaded from an unloaded launch canister. This would raise additional questions if launch canisters were located at other than test facilities where they were permitted. Shevchenko responded that the launch canister by itself posed no threat since once loaded it needed the power source from the launcher to run the environmental systems the ICBM required for proper operation.

It was important that realistic elimination procedures for launch canisters were agreed upon since Russia wished to use the eliminated launch canisters for agricultural use. Elliott agreed to take this request back to the U.S. delegation.

A MOVE ON MOBILE LAUNCHER ELIMINATION PROCEDURES

¶13. (S) Ryzhkov provided the U.S. side with Russian-proposed text for paragraph 4(a) of Section III, Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of ICBM Launchers: Removal of the bunkers (equipment boxes), removal of the erector-launcher mechanism, and destruction of its mountings in combination with the cutting of the launcher leveling supports off of the chassis. It was the opinion of the Russian side that these procedures placed the chassis in the same condition it was in after it had first left the production facility in Minsk. Seeing that the Russian-proposed text reflected discussion

from the previous meeting, Elliott said he would incorporate the text in the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text that was being prepared.

60-DAYS: AN ACT OF RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY

¶14. (S) Elliott asked Ryzhkov whether the Russian side had reconsidered the U.S. proposal for the 60-day period in which to verify elimination through NTM. He stated that U.S. experts stated the Russian-proposed 30-day time period would be insufficient for U.S. verification. Ryzhkov stated that as an act of Russian diplomacy, the Russian side accepted the 60-day period for verification by NTM for silo launchers of ICBMs. This was the only situation in which the Russian side would accept a 60-day period since the ICBM silo was not able to be removed from the site once eliminated.

REVIEW OF PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED
SLBM LAUNCHER CORE PROCEDURES

¶15. (S) The Russian delegation reviewed its proposed procedures for the conversion or elimination of SLBM launchers of November 25, 2009. After listening to Mr. Smirnov's review, Elliott questioned the difference between the time an eliminated SLBM launcher ceased to be subject to the treaty and the time when the submarine ceased to be subject to the treaty. He stated that the phrase, "upon the completion of its entire elimination," when referring to the elimination of the submarine, led to confusion on what was actually conducted during the entire elimination. Ryzhkov explained that the entire elimination process was the complete scrapping of the submarine. Elliott suggested that alternative language be drafted to better describe the process.

¶16. (U) Documents provided:

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-Proposed Text of CorE Part Three, Section II, Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs, dated November 30, 2009.

- Russia:

-- Russian-Proposed Text of CorE Part Three, Section II, Paragraph 2(a) Procedures for Elimination of ICBM and SLBMs, undated; and

-- Russian-Proposed Text of CorE Part Three, Section III, Paragraph 4(a) Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of ICBM Launchers, no date.

¶17. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
Lt Col Goodman
Mr. Celusnak
Mr. Coussa
Mr. Dwyer
Mr. Hanchett
LTC LaGraffe

Mr. Pfister
LT Sicks
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Voloskov
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

¶18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS